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ABSTRACT 
 
State owned companies are an important ingredient to economic development, in particular to 
South Africa as a developing country. They are created to serve a public interest objective and 
each entity derives its specific mandate from the state’s strategic objective. It is therefore 
important for these entities to be properly governed and operate within the realm of best 
governance and legislative frameworks. Notwithstanding this reality, State owned companies are 
generally embroiled in corruption and maladministration, which, in most cases, ultimately affect 
their ability to deliver on their mandate. If these trends continue unabated, they have a potential of 
creating instability within the country; erode confidence of the public in government and its 
entities; diminish public trust and negatively affect economic development   
 
Answers must be found, and urgently put in place, to turn the tide and revive accountability 
principles in state owned companies. This dissertation moves from the premise that corporate 
governance principles and practices and strict compliance with the requirements of legislative 
frameworks hold the much needed answers in addressing the fundamental governance failures 
and challenges faced by state owned companies and provides an overview of key corporate 
governance principles provide some pointers as to how these principles must be applied within 
the governance frameworks of State owned companies 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The state, or government, plays an important role in the development of a country’s 
economy. The state has the ability to incorporate legal entities, known as state owned entities 
(SOEs) or state owned companies (SOCs), for the purpose of participating in commercial 
activities in order to positively stimulate the economy. These SOCs are established in several 
key sectors of the economy. For instance, the Water Services Act 108 of 1998 is the 
legislation that constitutes water boards
1
  in  the  country  under  the  oversight  responsibility 
of  a  member  of  the  executive authority responsible for water and sanitation and their 
primary mandate is to supply bulk water to municipal customers who in turn must supply to 
end users.  
 
The Electricity Act 42 of 1922 created the Electricity Control Board (ECB) and the Electricity 
Supply Commission (what is today known as Eskom) with the specific statutory powers and 
mandate to supply electricity. The South African Broadcasting Corporation’s (the SABC) 
existence dates back to the early 1900s, but the Broadcasting Act 73 of 1976 was the legislative 
instrument for its incorporation. The SABC became known as the mouthpiece of the apartheid 
government, which is one of the reasons why in 1999 the Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999 was 
enacted to establish a new broadcasting policy and to re-position the SABC from being the 
mouthpiece of the apartheid government to becoming the public broadcaster that is 
independent, impartial and free from political manipulation.  
 
The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), an SOC operating in the financial industry, 
with the primary aim of developing new businesses and growing existing ones was 
established in 1940 as a national development finance institution set up to promote economic 
growth and industrial development in terms of the Industrial Development Corporation Act 22 
of 1940.  
 
Other key SOCs providing key infrastructure for the economy are Transnet, South African 
Airways (SAA), the South African Post Office, Airports Company of South Africa and 
Telkom to mention but a few.
2
 All these companies were incorporated by the state to serve a 
                                                          
1
 Water boards are classified as schedule 3B National Government Business Enterprises in terms of the Public 
Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, hereafter referred to as PFMA. 
2
 Major public entities listed in schedule 2 of the PFMA. 
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particular public interest objective.
3
 
 
The common rhetoric, particularly in the media and business / investment circles, regarding 
South African SOCs is one of inefficiency, non-delivery, maladministration, fraud and 
corruption. Such rhetoric ultimately points to weaknesses in these entities’ governance. SOCs, 
unlike private companies, bridge the divide between corporations and the public. Due to 
their unique political and socio-economic dynamics and operations, SOCs warrant special 
attention in relation to more efficient corporate governance policies and implementation 
frameworks with the aim of improving SOCs’ performance. 
 
This dissertation seeks to analyse the state of affairs on how companies are currently governed 
in South Africa, with a particular focus and emphasis on SOCs.  As alluded to earlier, there is a 
substantial number SOCs operating in a wide range of industries. This paper does not purport 
to analyse all of them, but will confine itself to key court decisions affecting SOCs that have 
placed SOCs under scrutiny for alleged poor corporate governance. The aim will be to identify 
governance shortcomings and challenges faced by some of the key SOCs, and weigh them 
against the legislative and regulatory framework. Further lessons will be sought from 
instructive jurisprudence laid down by the courts. The paper will then attempt to formulate 
proposals that may improve governance in state owned companies. 
 
2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose of the study is to evaluate the legislative and regulatory frameworks governing 
SOCs  with  the  view  of  pin-pointing  governance  challenges  experienced  by  key SOCs 
and evaluate key court judgments with the view to contribute to the public disco urse 
that aims at reviving the best governance and accountability principles in South Africa’s state 
owned companies. 
 
3 .  SIGNIFICANCE  
 
As a developing country crippled by gross levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment, 
South Africa’s SOCs are one of the key catalysts to the stimulation of economic activity in 
South Africa.
4
 The success of the broader objective largely depends on the sustainability of 
                                                          
3
  ‘National Development Plan 2011 - Vision 2030’, available at 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/devplan_2.pdf. accessed on 22August2018 
4
 Ibid. 
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these SOCs, more importantly the resilience of their governance frameworks becomes key 
to the success of the country. As demonstrated in chapters to follow, some scholars point out 
that corporate governance is highly correlated with better corporate performance.
5
 If this was 
true then South Africa desperately and urgently needs properly governed SOCs that are 
systematically and fundamentally resolute to act within the confines of the legislative and 
regulatory frameworks. 
 
It is often argued that the success of a government can be measured by the resilience of its 
governance structures and systems and adherence to those by all, irrespective of the positions 
they hold. It is equally important to analyse and assess the effectiveness of SOCs through the 
evaluation of their governance prescripts. Where there are areas of concern or improvement, 
such challenges must be identified to encourage the dialogue and enrich the jurisprudence, 
hoping that those who occupy positions of influence would ultimately motivate for the 
adoption of such invaluable contribution to the broader discourse. 
 
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: 
 
 What is the objective of state involvement in business activity (formation of state 
owned companies)? 
 What is the significance of good corporate governance principles, particularly in 
relation to state owned companies (SOCs)? 
 What could be attributed to the dismal failures of state owned companies? 
 
 
These questions will culminate into the main question of this dissertation, namely: Why is 
corporate governance a challenge for SOCs? 
 
5. METHODOLOGY  
The dissertation is based on a qualitative approach, analysing various documents on the 
subject matter, amongst others, the Constitution of the Republic, various pieces of legislation 
to which SOCs are obligated to comply with, judicial guidance through court judgments, codes 
                                                          
5
 Klapper & Love ‘Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets’ 
(2004) 10 Journal for Corporate Finance 703-705.   
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of best practices in corporate governance, to mention but a few. Information coming from the 
mentioned categories of documents provides clear guidelines and answers to the research 
question. The dissertation further looks at scholarly articles on the subject matter. 
 
6. OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
Chapter one: Introduction 
As evidenced above, this chapter provides an introductory overview to the study; it indicates the 
objectives and the significance of the study and further, as will be shown below, also provides 
the structure of the research showing the flow of the contents as will be found in chapters to 
follow. In addition to the introductory chapter, this dissertation is made up of five other 
chapters: 
Chapter two: Defining corporate governance 
This chapter seeks to highlight the significance of corporate governance within the SOCs whilst 
defining key concepts relevant to addressing corporate governance challenges faced by SOCs.  
 
Chapter three: An overview of the legislative framework 
This chapter will from a corporate governance perspective, and at a high level, display the 
legislative framework within which SOCs are mandated to exercise their functions and 
objectives within the realms of the law. 
 
Chapter four: Key role players 
This chapter will describe the roles and interplay of different role-players involved in the 
governance of SOCs as envisioned by applicable legislation and through court decisions. 
 
Chapter five: An overview of selected SOCs  
This chapter looks at some of the key SOCs who have had their governance challenges laid bare 
in the public domain, and through their exposure, jurisprudence has been developed. The 
reference to these selected SOCs is in the context of legislative provisions and regard will be 
given to court judgments involving these SOCs relating to their legislative mandate and 
regulatory frameworks. 
 
14 
 
Chapter six: Conclusion and Recommendations  
This chapter concludes the research paper by summarizing the study findings and assessing 
whether the study objectives were met. It also makes some key recommendations on how to 
respond to the identified challenges.  
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CHAPTER TWO: DEFINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter highlights corporate governance as a critical variable in promoting 
economic development, particularly in South Africa, but the same holds true around the world. 
For example, the World Bank described Africa’s stifled development as a ‘crisis of 
governance’.6 This chapter seeks to define corporate governance whilst providing an overview 
of key corporate governance concepts and their significance in relation to South Africa’s SOCs. 
Such concepts include accountability, transparency and ethics. 
 
2. DEFINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
Despite the popularity of the term ‘corporate governance’, its precise definition has proven 
elusive largely because the notion has been analysed and defined from different stakeholders’ 
perspectives. Below are some definitions offered by academics and business practitioners. 
 
There is academic support for the view that corporate governance refers to the set of internal 
and external controls that reduce the conflict of interest between the managers and shareholders 
deriving from the separation of ownership and control.
7
 The significance of this is highlighted 
in chapter 4 below where the different role players in SOCs are discussed. Further to this 
relationship-based definition, other well renowned experts on the subject of corporate 
governance, define corporate governance as the ‘relationship among various participants in 
determining the direction and performance of corporations’.8 They list shareholders, 
management, and the board of directors as primary participants in corporate governance.
9
 
 
A view from the shareholder’s perspective is offered by Dr Sternberg, who defines corporate 
governance as ‘the mechanism by which corporate actions are geared toward achieving 
corporate objectives established by shareholders’.10 She opines that it is ultimately the 
shareholder’s responsibility to ensure that management uses the corporation’s assets effectively 
and efficiently to fulfill corporate objectives.
11
 This view finds support in Sir Cadbury’s view 
that corporate governance dictates that a director’s sole consideration when conducting the 
                                                          
6
 World Bank  ‘Held by the visible hand: The challenge of SOE corporate governance for emerging markets’ 2006 
28 Journal of General Management 1. 
7
 Fama & Jensen ‘Separation of ownership and control’ 1983 26 Journal of Law and Economics 301 326. 
8
 Monks & Minow Corporate Governance (1995) 1. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 E Sternberg Corporate Governance Accountability in the Marketplace (2004) 10.   
11
 Ibid.  
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corporation’s business is the best interests of the shareholder, to the exclusion of other 
stakeholders.
12
  
 
A broader approach, which the thesis supports, is offered by Naidoo who envisions corporate 
governance as a system of checks and balances that ensure a balanced exercise of power, 
compliance with its legal and regulatory obligations, the management of risk, and accountability 
to the broader society in which the corporation operates.
13
 Naidoo also places emphasis on 
leadership that is accountable, transparent, and answerable to the company’s stakeholders, 
whilst balancing the shareholders’, the corporations’ and societal needs as a whole. This 
definition has special relevance to SOCs given the political and socio-economic environment in 
which they operate. They are, by law, expected to operate in a transparent manner and they 
must be put through scrutiny and are fundamentally accountable to the general public merely 
because they serve as stewards on behalf of the general public. 
 
In line with the broader approach that is supported by this dissertation, the OECD defines 
corporate governance as:  
 
‘a set of relationships between a company’s management, Board, shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of 
the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
are determined.’14 
 
Khan defines corporate governance as the processes, customs, policies and laws that direct 
corporations in the way they carry out and control their operations, whilst enhancing the long 
term shareholder value by ensuring accountability and improving the corporation’s 
performance.
15
  
 
Taking the broad approach too far is Hyden
16
 who opines that governance refers to the duty or 
task of running a government or entity.
17
 With this definition, officials involved in corruption 
                                                          
12
 Mongalo ‘Self regulation versus statutory codification: Should the new regime of corporate governance be 
accorded statutory backing?’ (2004) Journal of Contemporary Roman Dutch Law 266.   
13
 Naidoo An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2002) 1.   
14
 Available at http://www.fsb.org/2015/09/cos_040401/, accessed on 27 October 2018  
15
 Khan A Literature Review of Corporate Governance (2011) 1.  
16
 Hyden The Concept of Governance in Africa (1992). 
17
 Ibid. 
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can claim to have adhered to corporate governance as they did not necessarily derelict their 
duties whilst looting. This strict definition could lead to an untenable position. However, to his 
credit, Hyden adds that there must be a ‘conscious management of regime structures with the 
view to enhance legitimacy of the public realm’,18 which by implication, entails that there must 
be rules and processes geared toward eradicating practicing that would tarnish the entities’ 
legitimacy, for example corruption. The definition must necessarily be restricted by concepts 
that eradicate instances of corruption and maladministration that plague SOCs. Such concepts 
are discussed in the next section. 
 
The definitions above, notwithstanding merit in them, are either too narrow or are presented in a 
convoluted manner adding elements that are redundant or rely on the purpose of corporate 
governance, rather than defining it. Stripped to its essence, the paper submits that the 
appropriate definition of corporate governance is: 
‘A legal and rule based regulatory framework that governs the running of an entity based on the 
principles of accountability, transparency, ethics, good faith and the reputational wellness of the 
corporation’. 
 
3. KEY DOCTRINES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The next chapter analyses the legislative and regulatory framework of corporate governance. 
Before delving into that topic, it is important to discuss key concepts and principles associated 
with public finance raised in such framework. It would be a futile exercise attempting to draw 
an exact recipe of governance that would be effective for all corporations.
19
 This is due to the 
fact that there are numerous variables involved, such as the environment and culture in which a 
corporation operates; the applicable legal framework; the history of the relevant society; and the 
roles of the active market forces.
20
 However, having traversed the literature, as will be shown 
below, one can extrapolate a few key principles that appear universal to all corporations with 
good governance and form the basis for the South African legal and regulatory framework. 
These are discussed in turn below: 
 
(a) Accountability 
In the context of South Africa’s constitutional democracy, government, its officials and all 
public entities, must account for their actions to the citizenry. For instance, section 32 of the 
                                                          
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Dodija Emergence of Corporate Contract Set, Governance and Accountability (2008) 4. 
20
 Williamson ‘Corporate governance’ 1984 93 Yale Law Journal 1197.  
18 
 
Constitution
21
 promotes access to information as a way of promoting accountability. 
 
This requires that those entrusted with the public entities must display care and responsibility in 
carrying out their mandates, which in turn fosters a culture of openness, honesty and 
productivity.
22
 SOCs are bound by the Constitution, which means that accountability forms the 
foundational basis of good governance. Directors are accountable to shareholders and 
management is accountable to directors. 
 
In addition to accountability, the King Reports, in particular King II (2002) and King III (2009) 
and King IV (2016) mention related principles such as discipline, responsibility, fairness, and 
transparency.  
 
(b) Transparency 
Transparency entails an openness and willingness to report accurate information to all 
stakeholders. For instance, reporting requirements specified in sections 32 and 40(4) of the 
PFMA require that SOCs report expenditure and revenue information for all programs to the 
National Treasury on a monthly basis.
23
 In addition, SOCs are legally required to provide 
reports to other departments and institutions, such as the National Treasury, the Auditor 
General, Provincial Treasuries, and the Offices of the Premiers.
24
 As entities of state, SOCs are 
accountable to parliament to report on their activities on an annual basis.
25
 Parliament 
represents the voice of the people- considering that parliamentarians are public representatives 
elected in terms of the electoral legislative process. For this reason, amongst many others, 
activities by parliamentarians in exercising their representative duties, take place in an open 
atmosphere that allows parliament to be open to the general public, including during 
parliamentary briefings on the performance of the SOCs. This is a fundamental aspect of good 
corporate governance for SOCs. 
 
Transparency is a key component for driving growth and progress as all government 
institutions, business and the general public is privy to governments’ business. Transparency 
indicates benevolence and builds trust and confidence with investors, the general populace and 
                                                          
21
 Section 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
22
 Gildenhuys Public Financial Management 1993. 
23
 Fung ‘The demand and need for transparency and disclosure in corporate governance’ (2014) 73 Universal 
Journal of Management 80. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Section 65 of the PFMA. 
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is a foundation for economic stability.
26
 
 
(c) Ethics 
An ethical perspective of corporate governance is founded on core values of integrity, honesty 
and trust.
27
 It is said that corporations with reputations of good ethical practices are more likely 
to attract talent, investment and have a positive influence in the market which creates customer 
loyalty.
28
  
Some academics contend that negotiated and expressed ethical standards and values form the 
foundation of corporate governance.
29
 Rossouw submits a concept of ‘the governance of ethics’ 
which supposes a corporation’s ethical governance through, amongst other things, the 
development of codes of ethics and rules of conduct, and requires that the boards of directors 
and staff be trained on such codes, and an ongoing assessments or audits on the adherence to the 
codes.
30
 
As mentioned above, SOCs are plagued by allegations of maladministration, corruption and 
deliberate disregard of the rules or regulatory expectations. This speaks to a general lack of 
ethical standards in the general administration of SOCs and, the thesis submits that government 
must take positive and urgent steps to re-inculcate ethical standards in particular in SOCs.  
 
4. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOCS 
As mentioned above, SOCs are government’s arm mandated to further the agenda of state 
development, for a public purpose and in the interest of the general populace. An element of an 
emerging economy, such as South Africa, is a ‘major preoccupation… to ensure sustained 
economic growth and development on the back of high rates of accumulation, industrialisation 
and structural change.’31  Although there many variables and stimulus for economic growth, the 
performance of SOCs is of critical importance, much of which hinges on good governance 
practices. OECD research submits that globally, SOCs account for twenty percent of investment 
                                                          
26
 State Capacity Research Project ‘Betrayal of the promise: How South Africa is being stolen’ available at 
https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/  accesses on 26 October 2018. 
27
 Arjoon Corporate Governance An Ethical Perspective (2005) 20.   
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Young & Thyil Anglo-based Governance- Rules versus Flexibility: The Continual Debate Contemporary Issues 
in International Corporate Governance (2009) 11; see also Fleming & McNamee ‘The ethics of corporate 
governance in public sector organizations’ (2005) 7 Public Management Review 137, who argue that a moral 
philosophy drives a corporations governance.  
30
 Rossouw ‘The ethics of corporate governance: A (South) African perspective’ (2009) 51 International Journal of 
Law and Management 10. 
31
 United Nations DESA ‘State-owned enterprise reform national development strategies policy notes.’ 2007 
available at  http://esa.un.org/techcoop/documents/PN_SOEReformNote.pdf . accesses on 27 October 2018  
20 
 
and five percent of employment. In Africa, they produce around fifteen percent of GDP, in Asia 
eight percent and in Latin America six percent, whereas in Central and Eastern Europe the 
sector remains significant, accounting for 20 to 40 percent of output.
32
  
   
To bring it home, in South Africa, in the 2010/2011 financial year, two major SOCs, Eskom and 
Transnet made up more than two-thirds of the total procurement expenditure  in SOCs (R114 
billion) or seventeen percent of government’s total procurement budget.33 Furthermore, both 
these SOCs were listed in the top eight state guarantee exposure, meaning if Eskom’s debt alone 
were to be repayable, this could immediately bankrupt South Africa. 
34
 This illustrates how 
important it is for SOCs to be properly governed and remain in a going concern trajectory.
35
 
 
According to the World Bank, the overall performance of many SOCs globally has been below 
par, with meagre productivity compared to their private counterparts.
36
 The World Bank argues 
that SOCs have been used by politicians to reward their supporters and gain in popularity, 
leading to distorted financial systems and monetary policy.
37
 Choang and Lopez-de-Silanes,
38
 
and the World Bank
39
 attributed SOCs’ poor performance squarely on fundamentally flawed 
governance problems. In the late 1970s, many countries began attempting to turn this tide by 
introducing reforms aimed at enhancing SOC performance through improved governance. 
Although strong governance may not remedy all ills that plague SOCs, such as corruption, it has 
been argued that good governance assists with the early diagnosis and treatment of such ills.
40
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 OECD OECD guidelines on corporate governance of state-owned enterprises (2005).  
33
 Ibid at 26. 
34
 Ibid.  
35
 ‘The Auditor-General’s report on the status of state owned enterprises 2016/2017’ available at  
http://www.agsa.co.za/Portals/0/Reports/PFMA/201617/GR/04percent20statuspercent20ofpercent20state-
ownedpercent20enterprises.pdf  accessed on 19 November 2018 
36
 World Bank ‘Held by the visible hand: The challenge of SOE corporate governance for emerging markets’ 2006 
28 Journal of General Management 1. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Chong & López-de-Silanes Corporate Governance in Latin America (2007). 
39
 World Bank op cit note 36. 
40
 Khoza & Adam The Power of Governance: Enhancing the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises (2005). 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Good corporate governance should be a key feature in how the affairs of every SOC are 
managed. Failure to appreciate the significance of corporate governance and relegating 
corporate governance to triviality, as illustrated above, risks undermining the constitutional 
principles of accountability, transparency or openness and is a good recipe for poor 
performance by SOCs. 
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CHAPTER THREE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, government implements its programmes through 
legally constituted national or provincial departments. Over and above the government 
departments, the state can, in some instances, fully participate in the mainstream economic or 
business ventures through its own companies who are treated differently to executive 
government departments.
41
 The legislative environment allows the state (on behalf of the 
people of South Africa) to form companies. There is, therefore, a distinction between the 
government departments, whose tasks are primarily to implement policies, whilst business 
ventures by the state are primarily aimed at operating outside the public service, but within 
public administration whilst exploring business advantages without being frustrated by 
government bureaucracy, or red tape accustomed to state decision making complexities.
42
 A 
typical SOC is usually a creature of statute whose mandate is for the general benefit of the 
public. As the Presidential Review Committee Report suggests there is a need to ‘… review 
whether South Africa’s SOEs are functioning according to the common agenda.’43  
 
The governance mandate, primary activity, oversight reporting obligations and operating 
perimeters of SOCs are usually entrenched in the statute that creates such an SOC, in some 
instances through executive decision
 
promulgation, hence SOCs are obligated to act within the 
legislative mandate given to them by the enabling legislation. Some key pieces of legislation 
will be critically analysed throughout this study and the effect they have on the governance 
expectations of that particular SOC.   
 
 
(a) The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
 
The constitutional dispensation ushered in an era where the government is mandated to 
realise the values of the Constitution. This mandate is a recurring theme throughout the 
Constitution, starting from the preamble which foresees the creation of ‘a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights’. It reads: 
 
‘…We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the 
supreme law of the Republic so as to — 
                                                          
41
 Ibid at 3. 
42
 Ibid . 
43
 ‘Report: Presidential review committee on state owned entities (South Africa) vol 2 at 28’, available at 
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/presreview.pdf , accessed on 17 August 2018 
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… Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person …’ 
 
 
To echo the values enshrined in the Constitution, the writer agrees with the National Planning 
Commission and the Presidential Review Committee on State-Owned Entities’ reports when 
they make the assertion that SOCs are the delivery arm of the government for the realisation of 
ultimately ‘a public interest mandate.’44 If that were so, then governance instruments and 
management policies and procedures must reflect the same value systems as enshrined in the 
Constitution. In buttressing these values, section 32 of the Constitution deals with access to 
information. It stipulates that everyone has the right to information held by the state and its 
organisations, which is binding on SOCs. Adherence to this results in transparency in the 
running of SOCs. 
 
 
As the dictum in Alfred McAlpine & Son
45
 poignantly demonstrated, long before the advent 
of this democratic dispensation, that the general trend was that those in positions of 
authority in SOCs failed to demonstrate openness and accountability for mishaps that occur 
in those respective companies.  
 
All role-players in the governance of SOCs have a duty of care and this duty should be the 
epitome of how SOCs operate. The duty to act with ‘reasonable care’ is central to ensuring 
the sustainability of state owned companies. All those who are given the responsibility to 
manage or provide oversight assurance over the affairs of SOCs are charged with a legal 
obligation to act to the best interest of the company and to act in good faith at all material 
times.
46 
The themes of openness, transparency and accountability are further highlighted in 
the PFMA. 
 
(b) Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
 
It is trite that the legislative framework in South Africa has placed an important burden on the 
directors of SOCs, shareholders, management and prescribed officers to ensure that they all 
act in the best interest of the company and, ultimately, in the interest of the public.
47
 The 
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 Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration  (1974) 3 SA 506 (A); also affirmed in 
Nedcor Bank Ltd v SDR Investment Holdings Co Pty Ltd and others (2008) 11 ZASCA at 12. 
46
 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen (1980) 4 SA 156 (W). 
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 Section 33 of the Constitution affords citizens the right to just administrative action and reads: ‘Just 
administrative action.(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair. (2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given 
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Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
 
(PAJA) defines administrative action as any 
decision, including failures to take a decision, by an organ of state that has an adverse 
effect on a person’s rights. By virtue of section 239 of the Constitution,48 SOCs – 
notwithstanding their separate legal identity - constitute organs of state. As such, PAJA is 
applicable to the conduct of SOCs. It is trite that decisions taken by organs of state constitute 
administrative actions
49 
which require that decisions by officials, using public money, on 
behalf of a public body, acting purportedly in the public interest must always ask themselves 
whether they are acting in a just manner, in a rational manner, and there is adequate 
transparency in such decision making. This is the fundamental aspect of promoting good 
governance by all organs of state, but and more importantly by SOCs. This has been 
emphasised by the Supreme Court of Appeal.
50 
In Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd & others 
v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council & others
51
the court stated: 
 
‘…it is a fundamental principle of the rule of law, recognised widely, that the exercise of 
public power is only legitimate where lawful. The rule of law ─ to the extent at least that it 
expresses this principle of legality ─ is generally understood to be a fundamental principle of 
constitutional law.’ 
 
In  Mvoko v SABC 
52 
the court held: 
 
‘In this respect, regard should firstly be had to the basic values and principles governing public 
administration set out in s 195 of the Constitution which provides, amongst others, that services 
must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias, and that public administration 
must be accountable. In terms of s 195(2) these principles apply to administration in every 
sphere of government, organs of state and public enterprises’.53 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
written reasons.(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must— (a) provide for 
the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; (b) 
impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); and (c) promote an efficient 
administration.’ 
48
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Mvoko v SABC
54
 further illustrates that the corporate governance of SOCs must be informed by 
principles of impartiality, fairness and equity, and accountability. Judicial review of 
administrative action and the procedures to be followed when instituting such proceedings are 
governed by sections 6 and 7 of PAJA.  Such grounds of review were outlined in 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange v Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd
55 
as: 
 
‘a)  failure to apply one’s mind to the relevant issues; 
b)  that the decision was arbitrary or capricious or mala fide; 
c)  that the decision was as a result of an unwarranted adherence to a fixed principle; 
d)  that the decision was arrived at in order to further an ulterior or improper purpose; 
e)  that the decision was as a result of taking into account irrelevant considerations or ignoring 
relevant facts; and 
f) that the decision was grossly unreasonable.’ 
 
It is submitted that although the standard set by courts for rational, lawful and transparent 
actions by organs of state is generally the same, it is of critical importance to SOCs who are 
arguably at the forefront of enhancing economic activity in South Africa – the developmental 
agenda.
56
 
 
(c) Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA) 
 
The PFMA was promulgated to give effect to chapter 10, read with chapter 13, of the 
Constitution, primarily to ensure the protection of the public purse by government 
departments, organs of state and the SOCs or any other legal entity that falls within public 
service or public administration. 
 
The PFMA gives effect to section 216 (1) of the Constitution which speaks to the 
establishment of a National Treasury whose role is to prescribe and ensure both transparency 
and expenditure control in each sphere of government by introducing generally recognised 
accounting practices and uniform expenditure classifications, and uniform treasury norms and 
standards. 
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By means of the PFMA, the National Treasury is empowered to determine the financial 
management framework and set the norms and standards that are applicable to all spheres of 
government. The Constitution also accords the Treasury with the responsibility to oversee 
other organs of state in all spheres of government.
57
 To illustrate the powers vested in Treasury, 
section 49(3) of the PFMA, indicates that Treasury may approve or instruct another 
functionary of a public entity to become an accounting authority. The active role played by 
Treasury in managing the affairs of the SOCs increases the accountability and reporting 
requirements of the SOCs. 
 
The Auditor-General (A-G) constitutes another layer of governance structure overseeing the 
financial management affairs of SOCs. The A-G’s powers and duties are enumerated in the 
Public Audit Act 25 of 2004 and the PFMA. In terms of section 6 (a), the A-G can investigate 
or audit the financial statements of any public entity. The A-G is thus an important role player 
in accountability related issues in relation to SOCs. Some SOCs are also governed by the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008. As has been observed in the A-G’s latest report on the status of 
state-owned entities, there still exists numerous of areas of non-disclosure and sub-minimal 
performance from SOCs, all of that pointing to the reality that there still remain major 
governance challenges in SOCs.
58
 
 
The critical question is: What happens when all role players are unable to detect the 
governance lapses or are party to the mishaps? What is clear from recent court judgments
59 
is that in the governance framework of SOCs, there are a number of value contributing players 
starting from management to directors, then to assurance providers (like company secretary, 
auditors), then outside interested parties (like investors), then shareholder representatives, then 
the public, on whom the reliance on their bona fides is crucial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
57
 Section 216 of the Constitution, read with section 49 of the PFMA. 
58
 Ibid at 35. 
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 See Constitutional Court judgments in EFF v Speaker of Parliament & others (CCT76/17) (2017) ZACC 47; 
2018 (3) BCLR 259 CC (29 December 2017); South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd & others v 
Democratic Alliance & others (2015) 4 All SA 719 (SCA); the Public Protector v Mail and Guardian Ltd & others 
2011 (4) SA 420 (SCA); and SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition & others v SABC & others (81056/14) 
(2017) ZAGP JHC 289 (17 October 2017). 
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(d)  The Companies Acts 
 
The main legislative prescript governing the affairs of Companies in South Africa has over a 
long time been through the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (the old Act), more recently through 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the new Act). Over and above these two pieces of legislation, 
there are other pieces of legislation dealing with issues around the rules regulating how 
companies, through their directors and employees, ought to conduct their affairs; the recourse 
shareholders have against directors of the company in which they hold shares; the protection 
of the interests of employees and third parties.
60
 
 
The new Act ushered in a new dispensation that sought to bring the legislative framework to 
par with modern challenges in the realm of company law. The preamble to the new Act 
suggests that policy makers felt that the old Act had become obsolete and needed to be 
overhauled in its entirety and by introducing provisions that would make it relevant to the 
new challenges faced by companies and the public in general on company law matters. 
 
(e)  Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (PCCAA) 
 
Section 34 of the PCCAA creates a duty to report corrupt activities. Anyone who holds a 
position of authority and who can be expected to reasonably know that an offence has been 
committed is obligated to report any corrupt activities they may become aware of. 
 
On this premise, it is evident that an analysis of the governance of SOCs must necessarily be 
conducted at a macro and micro level. Due to the external political influences on SOCs, the 
macro  level  relates  to  the  interface  between  managers,  board  members,  ministers  and 
parliament.  A microcosmic analysis elucidates the relationship between the board of directors, 
senior management, shareholders, prescribed officers and auditors.  
 
3. CONCLUSION 
When all of these players are unable to observe the legislative frameworks within which they 
should operate, or are unable to detect, or are intrinsically part of, the governance failures in 
SOCs, then the public protector or all chapter 9 institutions are the last line of defense. This 
means all these players are part of the defense and they should all play the key part in 
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defending the public interest in their spheres of responsibility. This study makes a few 
suggestions on how such defenses by all the role-players can be enhanced with the view of 
reviving the best governance principles in SOCs. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: KEY ROLE PLAYERS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over and above some of the role players that are mentioned in the concluding remarks of the 
previous chapter, this chapter describes the roles and interplay of key, but not all, different role 
players involved in the governance of SOCs. It starts with a description of the relationship 
between government and SOCs’ boards of directors, and ends off with an analysis of the 
relationship of between the Executive and the Parliament.  
 
2. PARLIAMENT 
 (a) Introduction 
The different spheres of government derive their powers from the Constitution. The National 
Assembly and Provincial Legislature exercise an oversight role over the executive arm of 
government. Sections 55(2)
61
 and 42(3)
62
 of the Constitution empower the National Assembly 
to put in place measures that ensure that the executive arm is accountable to it, and for the 
National Assembly to maintain an oversight on the executive’s exercise of its authority and 
implementation of legislation. Section 92(3) (b)
63
 of the Constitution mandates the executive to 
provide full and regular reports of their dealings to Parliament. 
  
The executive exercises an oversight role over SOCs. As such, the Constitution vests power on 
the National Assembly and the provincial legislatures to oversee executive and SOE 
performance. This role is facilitated mostly through annual reports, which are regulated by 
statutes such as the PFMA and the Public Service Act 103 of 1994, as amended. Section 65
64
 of 
the PFMA requires the Executive to table the annual reports for SOCs. There are 35 national 
departments overseeing over 250 SOCs. Parliamentary committees have been put in place to 
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handle the sheer volume of reports the executive tables before Parliament. The introduction of 
the committees has the added benefit of creating specialised expertise in certain fields. 
 
 (b) Parliamentary committees 
  (i) Public accounts committee 
The audit reports of the Auditor General are reviewed by the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (SCOPA). This committee plays the important role of protecting public money. It 
fulfils this role by scrutinising issues raised in the Auditor-General’s audit reports, financial 
probity issues, and compliance issues with relevant legislation, expenditure considered 
unauthorised, fruitless and wasteful. SCOPA will also scrutinise risk management systems and 
corporate governance issues.  
 
  (ii) Portfolio committees 
Portfolio committees concern themselves primarily with service delivery performance of SOCs. 
They do this by reviewing non-financial information contained in the annual reports of SOCs. 
They however consider the SOC’s financial performance in order to obtain a holistic 
appreciation of the SOC’s performance. They use the performance indicators presented in 
annual reports as a yardstick to measure performance. These committees also evaluate the 
quality of the reports and they consider management’s explanation of poor performance, if any, 
and steps taken by management to rectify the circumstances. They then investigate the 
circumstances that led to the underperformance and the impact on service delivery     
 
The collaboration between SCOPA and the Portfolio Committees cannot be gainsaid if one is to 
obtain an overall picture of SOC performance. The success of the process depends heavily on 
the quality of information received from other role players. Corporate governance is critical 
throughout the entire process.  
 
3. THE GOVERNMENT’S/EXECUTIVE’S ROLE 
 (a) Introduction 
The executive’s relationship with SOCs is multi-faceted. As owner and shareholder, the 
executive seeks satisfactory returns on investments. As policy maker, the executive aims for 
efficient and effective implementation of policies and service delivery through SOCs. As the 
regulator, the executive concerns itself with the interests of the consumer by regulating industry 
practices and pricing structures.  
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 (b) Oversight role 
The executive’s oversight role entails monitoring and reviewing the affairs and practices of 
the SOC. The guiding principles in that regard are informed by the principles of good 
governance. The boards of directors of SOCs and their management are thus accountable to 
the executive and must ensure that all the necessary and appropriate corporate governance 
structures and controls are put in place and properly implemented. This oversight role is done 
in accordance with Section 52 of the PFMA. In the event of non-compliance or unsatisfactory 
performance, the executive has the power to dismiss directors and re-constitute the board of 
SOCs.  
 
 (c) Policy role 
The Constitution vests policy making authority in the executive arm of government. The 
executive thus shapes policy to meet the needs and mandate of South Africans. These 
policies, through the relevant ministers, are communicated down to the SOCs charged with 
implementing and delivery on the policy. The minister must ensure that the SOCs are 
capacitated to implement these policies. This entails putting necessary structures and 
practices, such as good governance, in place. Thereafter the executive’s role becomes one of 
monitoring and reviewing SOCs performance.  
 
 (d) Regulatory role 
The government has established regulators for specific industries. These regulators regulate a 
myriad of issues, ranging from pricing, consumer interests, to other industry interests. The 
relationship with the regulators and SCOs is more independent and objective, as compared to 
the shareholder relationship the executive has with the SCOs.  
 
4. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
 (a) Introduction 
The governing body of SOCs is the board of directors. It is ideally comprised of a mix of 
executive and non-executive directors equipped with the necessary skills to guide SOCs at a 
strategic level. Its mission is to fulfill the mandate of the SOCs, commercially and in terms of 
government policies, whilst remaining within the confines of the law, regulations and 
corporate governance prescripts. The board must exercise full and effective control over 
SOCs as it has ultimate responsibility and accountability for the performance of SOCs. The 
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board is bound by fiduciary duties as per the Companies Act of 2008 and the PFMA. 
 
 (b) Powers and duties of the board of directors 
The board of directors enjoys broad powers enabling it to execute its mandate. It is the 
board’s duty to produce an annual budget to be submitted to government and to the National 
Treasury. This budget must, amongst other things, contain: 
 
 ‘Plans for the SOC to have effective, efficient and transparent systems of operational, risk 
management and financial internal controls;   
 Plans for the monitoring of the executive management; 
 Succession plans for senior executives; 
 Ensure that the SOC operates ethically; 
 The SOCs internal audit system in compliance with sections 76 and 77 of the PMFA; 
 An appropriate procurement and provisioning system which is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective; and  
 A prevention plan against irregular expenditure, fruitless and wasteful expenditure, losses 
resulting from criminal conduct, and expenditure not complying with the operational policies 
of the SOC’.  
 
The board is responsible for submission of the SOCs’ reports to Parliament and the Treasury.  In 
terms of section 55 of the PFMA, the board must:
65
 
 
 • ‘keep full and proper records of the financial affairs of the SOE; 
 • prepare financial statements for each year in accordance with GAAP; 
• must submit the draft financial statements within two months after year-end to the treasury 
and auditors for auditing; and 
 • must submit the audited statements within 5 months after the financial year-end to 
Government, National Treasury and the Auditor-General’. 
 
The King Codes recommend that the board has a charter setting out its responsibilities, which 
should be documented in its annual report. The boards of SOCs are the conduit through which 
corporate governance principles are implemented in SOCs. The executive must closely monitor 
that the board fulfills this role. 
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The Chief Executive Officer, who ordinarily must be appointed by the oard, must focus on the 
efficient and effective running of the operations of the SOCs. The Chief Executive Officer is 
accountable to the board. There is often a pre-occupation by the executive authorities (ministers, 
who exercise shareholder representative responsibility) to want to be involved in the 
appointment of Chief Executives. Corporate governance principles,
66
 government’s own policy 
documents
67
 and case law
68
 dictate that this should not be so. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
It is therefore important that each of the role players understand their role and discharge their 
responsibility to the SOC in accordance with the principles of good governance and in 
compliance with the legislative prescripts. Failure to appreciate this fundamental point, has the 
potential of diverting energies of those in charge of the SOC and ultimately bring instability and 
cause inadequate performance to the detriment of the SOC and the public in general. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED SOCs 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an overview of three SOCs, namely the SABC, Eskom and Transnet and 
related governance challenges each has been faced with highlighting the importance of 
governance principles to safeguard SOCs. The overview of these corporations will be the broad 
topics surrounding the applicable legislative and regulatory environment, the interplay between 
the respective boards with management and performance monitoring mechanisms, role of 
shareholders as against that of the boards and funding regime for these SOCs. The chapter will 
also assess the political and market influences on these SOCs and the impact on corporate 
governance issues.  
 
2. SABC 
 (a) Historical overview 
The historical overview of the SABC is divided into two eras, the apartheid and the post-
apartheid eras. During the apartheid era, the SABC was merely a pawn used for the state’s 
propaganda and oppressive agenda. The change of regime in 1994 precipitated the 
transformation of the SABC into an important avenue of promoting democratic and 
constitutional values.    
 
The South African government first established the SABC in 1936 with radio services offered 
first in English and Afrikaans. Only in the 1950s and 60s did the SABC introduce radio services 
broadcast in African languages. During this period, the SABC was the mouthpiece of the 
National Party’s (NP) led government. The Broadcasting Act was the primary regulating statute, 
which gave the NP’s government exclusive control over broadcasting policy formulation and 
regulations. During this period, governance and management of the SABC lacked transparency 
and accountability to the general public.  The SABC catered for the white minority to the 
exclusion of other races. 
 
At the dawn of the constitutional dispensation in the early 90s, the NP and the ANC engaged in 
negotiations where the NP did not want the ANC to have unfettered control over the airwaves, 
whilst the ANC did not want the NP to maintain strangle hold it had over the same airwaves. 
This tussle of power brought during the Conference of Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in 
1992, brought about the Independent Broadcasting Act no 153 of 1993.  The idea was to have 
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an independent broadcaster. Whilst that was elusive during the apartheid era, some academics 
argue that that remains the case even during the constitutional era because the board is still 
plagued by undue political influence.  
 
 (b) The legislative and regulatory overview of the SABC 
The SABC is governed by the Constitution, the PFMA, the Companies Act, and the 
Broadcasting Act. Section 195 (1) of the Constitution provides that all public administration and 
management in all spheres of government should be efficient and effective in terms of 
resources, as well as be economically viable and accountable. The PFMA sets out the financial 
regulations. Section 9 of the Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999
69
 spells out the contrasting mandate of 
the SABC, that is the public service and commercial service mandate. The dichotomy causes 
inherent operational problems because, as there will always be, a conflict to fulfil the 
commercial aspects whilst public service may not bring about any financial returns.  This also 
creates tension between the board and management, the board and its shareholder.  
 
 (c) Contestations 
The SABC, by its very nature, is a contested terrain. As a result the corporation has had to deal 
with many challenges, some appearing briefly in the cases mentioned above in chapter three. 
The thesis will  focus on the one involving allegations of maladministration, systemic corporate 
governance deficiencies, abuse of power and the irregular appointment of Mr Motsoeneng by 
the SABC which culminated in a public protector investigation. The public protector’s report 
was eventually released and presented to Parliament titled When Governance and Ethics Fail. 
The public protector’s report identified the minister of communication’s political interference in 
the administrative affairs of the SABC. 
 
It found that the previous minister of communications , Ms Pule, unlawfully interfered with the 
recruitment and appointment of a Chief Financial Officer of the SABC in 2012. The 
contestations in the affairs of the SABC led to this matter finding its way to the courts in the 
SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition & others v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited & others.
70
 The main feature of the court action concerned the 
constitutionality and lawfulness of the powers that the minister exercises in respect of the 
directors of the SABC board.  
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 (d) Court Ruling  
The main findings in the ruling of the court are reflected below and are a positive outcome in 
restoring good corporate governance in SOCs: 
 
i. ‘The Non-Executive members of the Board of the SABC must be appointed by the President on 
the advice of the National Assembly, after a public nomination process which must be in 
compliance with section 13 of the Broadcasting Act. The President’s power to appoint the non-
executive board members of the SABC is a purely formal power as the National Assembly is the 
appointing authority who interviews and selects candidates before forwarding their names to the 
President for their formal appointment. The President has no discretion but to appoint the 
candidates recommended by the National Assembly as it is the only authority that is empowered 
to interview and select candidates. The same principle applies to the appointment of judges of 
the High Court.  
 
ii. The President (or any other person or functionary who is given a similar role in other SOCs) has 
no unfettered power. The parliamentary process provides the necessary checks and balances.   
 
iii. The exclusive power to control the affairs of the SABC rests with the Board. The Minister, or 
Executive Authority, is precluded from exercising any powers by which he or she may control 
the Directors in how they control the affairs of the SABC. The appointment and removal of 
Directors is the responsibility of the Board, not the political principals or anyone else. 
 
iv. The Chief Executive and his or her executive team must run the day-to-day affairs of the SABC 
without fear or favour and must only be subject to the constitutional principles as per the dictates 
of the constitution and its subordinate applicable legislation. 
 
v. Subordinate legislation, or policy documents and other instruments that enable the SABC to be 
properly governments, must be aligned and be in compliance with the prescripts of the 
constitution. If not, they stand to be rejected and set aside and substituted with provisions or 
instruments that speak to the core values of the constitution’. 
 
3. ESKOM 
 (a) Historical overview 
The historical overview of ESKOM is divided into various phases.
71
 It was effectively 
established through a Government Gazette of 6 March 1923 which announced the establishment 
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October 2018  
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of the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM – as it was referred to at the time), effective 
from 1 March 1923. Over the period, ESCOM was merely an entity that was structurally 
designed to ensure security of electricity supply for the minority part of the population and 
primarily for the industry. In late 1998, the government released a White Paper unveiling the 
government’s vision for the entity going forward. Ultimately parliament passed legislation, 
making Eskom a limited liability company with share capital and falling under the Companies 
Act. 
 (b)  The legislative and regulatory overview of ESKOM 
The conversion of Eskom took effect in 2002 when the Eskom Conversion Act 13 of 2001 was 
signed into law, clarifying that Eskom Holdings Limited (its new name) was now a public 
enterprise, but a public company with share capital and listed as a major entity in terms of 
schedule 2 of the PFMA. The government became the sole shareholder of Eskom with the 
minister of public enterprises being the executive authority representing the shareholder A board 
of directors was appointed by the relevant minister to replace the two-tier governance structure 
of the Electricity Council and the Management Board. This new board of directors was now 
charged with the responsibility to presided over the affairs of Eskom. 
 
Further to legislative compliance with the PFMA and the constituting legislation, Eskom is now 
incorporated and required to comply with the provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, as 
amended. In terms of the Treasury Regulations issued in accordance with the PFMA, Eskom 
must, in consultation with its executive authority annually conclude a shareholder compact 
documenting the mandated key performance measures and indicators to be attained by Eskom 
as agreed between the board of directors and the executive authority.  
 
 (c) Controversies  
As can be seen from various reports, Eskom is a significant contributor to the economic 
development in South Africa:
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 ‘As at the 2016/2017 financial analysis of the A-G, government has issued sovereign guarantees 
to the tune of R440, 26 billion. Of that amount, Eskom was issued with guarantees of R350 
billion.
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 If Eskom were to default in repayment of its debts and its creditors call from the immediate 
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payment of their loans, the South African fiscus would have to find this amount – and bankrupt 
the economy at once.
74
 
 Eskom’s procurement expenditure during the 2010/2011 financial year amounted to R74 billion 
amounting to 8.75percent of the total government procurement expenditure. That is significant 
enough for one entity’. 
 
If Eskom was this significant, one would expect that it is in the interests of the country for 
Eskom to be managed in the best possible ways. It should be one of the government’s priorities 
to ensure that Eskom is properly governed; that a functioning board is put in place and 
discharging its responsibilities in accordance with the principles discussed above; that a 
competent CEO is employed at all material times. However, as observed in the public 
protector’s report75 from 2014 governance processes in Eskom deteriorated. Changes to the 
board were effected and most of the new members of the new board had links with a 
controversial family that has been accused of gross governance transgressions. Procurement 
irregularities were escalating year in year out. During the 2016/2017 financial year Eskom’s 
irregular expenditure was over a staggering R4 billion.  
 
 (d) Observations   
In an environment where corporate governance principles were observed: 
 Eskom would not be allowed to operate without a fully functional board; 
 In appointing board members, greater care would be placed on the individual’s expertise 
and contribution they will bring to the board;  
 the best CEO would be appointed after a transparent process of trying to identify the best 
suitable candidate.  
 Appointment into any position would never be on the basis of the close proximity to 
certain individuals who are advancing their own interests at the expense of the public 
interest.  
 
4. TRANSNET 
 (a) Historical overview 
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 Public Protector South Africa ‘State of capture’, available at http://saflii.org/images/329756472-State-of-
Capture.pdf  accessed on 18 August 2018 
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Transnet’s history dates back to the 1800s but can be located in 1910 when the South African 
Railways and Harbors administration (SAR&H) was established as an arm of government.
 76
 Its 
constituting Act specified that it was to be run on business principles. The decade of the 1980s 
the entity changed its name to Transnet Ltd. 
The organisational reconstruction began in 1987 and was streamlined to a holding company 
with five financially independent operating subsidiaries. In April 1990 Transnet Ltd, a company 
with limited liability, representing a vast transport was unveiled. With the advent of democracy 
since 1994, Transnet visibly invested heavily on infrastructure programmes and on integrating 
and coordinating infrastructure programmes encouraging the use of road, pipeline, rail and 
harbor networks and within South African to transfer imports and exports. Transnet's vision and 
mission is to be a focused freight transport company, delivering integrated, efficient, safe, 
reliable and cost-effective services to promote economic growth in South Africa. 
Transnet, in its current governance structure, is made up of the following operating divisions:  
 ‘Transnet freight rail (formerly Spoornet – the freight rail division)  
 Transnet rail engineering (formerly Transwerk - the rolling stock maintenance business)  
 Transnet national ports authority (formerly the NPA - fulfils the landlord function for South 
Africa’s port system)  
 Transnet port terminals (formerly SAPO - managing port and cargo terminal operations in the 
nation’s leading ports), and  
 Transnet pipelines (formerly Petronet - the fuel and gas pipeline business, pumps and manages 
the storage of petroleum and gas products through its network of high-pressure, long distance 
pipelines).’77 
 (b) The legislative and regulatory overview of Transnet 
Transnet is listed as a major entity in terms of schedule 2 of the PFMA. The government of 
South Africa became the sole shareholder with the minister of public enterprises being the 
executive authority representing the shareholder. The relevant minister acts in the interests not 
only of the cabinet, but as a public representative, he or she is enjoined to act in the interests of 
the public at large. 
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 (c) Controversies  
Transnet’s procurement expenditure during the 2010/2011 financial year amounted to R70 
billion, second only to Eskom with an 8.3percent of the total government procurement 
expenditure. That is also significant enough for one entity. Besides its procurement expenditure, 
Transnet can be classified at the heartbeat of South Africa due to its complex network of 
business involvement, primarily the logistics business that drives South Africa’s economy. With 
this narrative, the governance of Transnet should be of paramount interest to government. 
However, Transnet, so as Eskom, is at the centre of the alleged manipulation of government 
processes and weakening of state institutions in order to loot from their coffers.
78
   
  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
From the narrative of the reports referred to above and from the court judgments, it is trite that 
SOCs have now become a contested terrain. There seems to be a preoccupation for the control 
of SOCs. The salient expressions as contained in the SABC judgment and the constitutionally 
framed provisions of the applicable legislation provides a positive narrative that seeks to 
channel and guide SOCs to observe the strictest corporate governance standards and be free 
from outside pressures, but concentrate in discharging their responsibilities to the general 
citizenry towards the achievement of national development goals and for a public benefit 
objective. There is also a clear message given to political principals not to interfere with the 
day-to-day affairs of the SOCs. However the politicians are expected to provide proper 
oversight over these entities without orchestrating the weakening of their governance 
frameworks.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The chapters above have demonstrated the significance of SOCs and how if governed 
appropriately they can enhance economic development to the ultimate benefit of the general 
public. By the same breath, the public interest agenda of SOCs may be hijacked and diverted to 
a trajectory not envisaged by public policy and constitutionalism. By their very nature, and 
regard being had to the significance that SOCs bring in the developmental sphere, they are 
susceptible to contestations. 
 
In this dissertation it has been highlighted that SOCs are a contested terrain. As evidenced, the 
contestations can either be positive and or negative. Positive contestations are informed by the 
rule of law, constitutionalism and the desire to serve the interest of the general public. Negative 
contestations are evident in various forms that include mala fide, political interference, attempts 
to weaken governance structures, patronage, lack of transparency, and  manipulation of 
governance systems in order to benefit those who are in close proximity to political power, to 
mention but a few. 
 
This dissertation has demonstrated that adherence to corporate governance principles and 
practices and strict compliance with the requirements of legislative frameworks hold the much 
needed answers in addressing the fundamental governance failures and challenges faced by 
SOCs. On that score the following recommendations may add another voice towards reviving 
the accountability principles in how SOCs are governed: 
 
 The executive authorities, that is, politicians, should always act in the best interests of 
the public. 
 The process of appointment of non-executive directors of SOCs should be based on the 
constitutional principles that include transparency, ethics, good faith, accountability and 
adherence to the rule of law. 
 Once board members (non-executive directors) of SOCs have been appointed, through a 
transparent process based on constitutional principles, the board should be given space 
do its work without any fear or favour.  
 The board, not the minister, must have the authority and be accountable for the 
appointment of a Chief Executive Officer of an SOC.  
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 Candidates for appointment as board members and Chief Executive Officers should pass 
a suitability test which must developed and be applied consistently for all SOCs. 
 Removal of board members and Chief Executive Officers of SOCs should not be an 
action that can be taken lightly. When taken there should be gravitas in the decision 
thereof. This will ensure and or maintain stability in the governance structures of SOCs. 
 Board members of SOCs must account fully for the activities of the SOC through 
appropriate compulsory disclosures. A compulsory disclosure or reporting framework 
for company secretaries, auditors and other assurance providers must be developed to 
ensure that what the SOC through its board, reports on in Parliament and to the relevant 
treasury, is a true reflection of all material occurrences during that specific financial 
year. 
 A central governance framework for SOCs must be developed for various categories of 
SOCs so as to maintain consistency in the application of decisions pertaining to SOCs. 
 
2. LIMITATIONS 
The study focused primarily on the key contributory factors that seem to cut across all SOCs 
and which have been dealt with by courts, including the public protector in various reports. The 
study could not look at all aspects and all cases and could not even look at all the challenges that 
are faced by all SOCs, but was an attempt to identify key contributory factors, which if 
addressed, could enable SOCs to perform better and remove any forms of disregard of the rule 
of law and constitutionalism in the affairs of SOCs. 
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